Book Review: Free to Believe: Rethinking Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Canada, by Mary Anne Waldron by Kislowicz, Howard
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 52, Issue 1 (Fall 2014) Article 8
Book Review: Free to Believe: Rethinking Freedom
of Conscience and Religion in Canada, by Mary
Anne Waldron
Howard Kislowicz
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Book Review
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Kislowicz, Howard. "Book Review: Free to Believe: Rethinking Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Canada, by Mary Anne
Waldron." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 52.1 (2015) : 303-310.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol52/iss1/8
303
FREE TO BELIEVE: RETHINKING FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 
AND RELIGION IN CANADA, by Mary Anne Waldron1 
MARY ANNE WALDRON’S Free to Believe: Rethinking Freedom of Conscience and 
Religion in Canada is an important and welcome contribution to the discussion 
of religious and conscientious freedom in Canadian law. In addition to being the 
first Canadian book to examine conscientious freedom specifically, it provides a 
thorough and incisive examination of the case law. Further, Waldron develops an 
alternative approach to addressing some apparently intractable conflicts. 
Waldron argues that the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has made a 
number of missteps in its jurisprudence of conscientious and religious freedom 
dating back to the earliest decisions in the Charter era. She offers three main lines 
of criticism. First, Waldron claims that judicial accounts of freedom of conscience 
and religion do not sufficiently explain the conscientious aspect of that freedom 
and its connection to a free, democratic society. Second, Waldron argues that 
when Canadian judges state that they are deciding cases on principles of religious 
freedom, their reasons often show them to be motivated by concerns related to 
equality rights. This, Waldron argues, leads them to make incoherent decisions 
that often arrive at the wrong result. Third, Waldron takes issue with courts and 
tribunals that engage in the balancing of rights. Rather than seeking balance, 
where one right is gained at the expense of another, courts should understand 
rights as relational, each defining the other’s limits. I will discuss each of these 
arguments in turn. 
1. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013) 312 pages.
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Waldron’s most pervasive criticism of Canada’s religious and conscientious 
freedom jurisprudence is the absence of conscience from the discussion. This 
stems in part from the fact that litigation has centred principally on religious 
practices rather than on non-religious claims of conscience. Waldron writes 
that the Court’s definition of religion requires faith in a divine being2 and that 
the “emphasis on connection with the divine” highlights the “private aspect of 
religious belief.”3 Though Waldron believes that “[c]onscience is integral to the 
human personality,”4 the prominence of private aspects of religious practice5 
obscures the public dimension of religious freedom and, concomitantly, the 
similarities between religions and other “organizing belief system[s].”6 For 
Waldron, freedom of conscience is a fundamental freedom primarily because it 
is part of the necessary foundation of a democratic state.7 The constitutional 
protection of divergent belief systems is a part of a democratic state’s commitment 
to free thought and a bulwark against totalitarianism. In her view,
[a] mature democratic state [copes with disagreements of belief ] … not by requir-
ing its citizens to pretend that “better,” “true,” and “preferable” do not exist, but by 
requiring its citizens to commit to the proposition that the only legitimate way to 
achieve victory for our vision of “better,” “true,” and “preferable” is by persuasion.8
Waldron argues in her second major line of critique that instead of drawing 
the link between conscientious freedom and democracy, courts have often been 
motivated by concerns related to equality.9 But the purpose of equality rights “is 
to protect particular claimed rights for individuals, not to open the understanding 
of the society to the possibilities of difference within the state.”10 This confusion 
2. Supra note 1 at 11. I do not think that this is a completely faithful representation of the 
Court’s definition of religion; I address this point more fully below.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid at 197.
5. Benjamin Berger argues that the treatment of religion as a private matter reflects Canadian 
constitutional law’s liberal culture. See Benjamin L Berger, “Law’s Religion: Rendering 
Culture” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall LJ 277.
6. Supra note 1 at 11.
7. Ibid at 9.
8. Ibid at 239.
9. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan’s study of religious freedom in the United States leads her to an 
opposite conclusion. For Fallers Sullivan, it is impossible for the law to legitimately define 
religion. In her view, disputes over religious practices are better resolved through the lens of 
equality. See Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005) at 149-59.\\i The Impossibility of Religious Freedom\\i0{} 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005
10. Supra note 1 at 82.
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of purpose leads courts into error, allowing those claiming to be protected by 
freedom of religion to restrict the religious freedoms of others. 
Waldron draws on a number of examples to illustrate this point. Her first 
example is the SCC’s first decision on the protection of freedom of religion under 
the Charter, R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd.11 There, a retailer had been charged under 
the federal Lord’s Day Act for selling goods on a Sunday. The SCC held that 
the Act had a religious purpose, i.e., compelling the observance of the Christian 
Sabbath, rendering the legislation unconstitutional. In rendering its decision, the 
Court was so concerned, in Waldron’s view, with an apparent inequality that it 
failed to satisfactorily connect the right of religious freedom with the democratic 
interests it is designed to protect. In her view, the SCC
relied primarily upon a misstatement of the purpose of the statute (the “compul-
sion” of Sabbath observance) and, when it more accurately stated the purpose (pro-
hibiting otherwise harmless acts because of their religious significance to others), 
completely failed to elucidate how that purpose limited or abrogated the freedom of 
religion of non-Sunday observers… .12
This failure of reasoning “encouraged the idea that citizens’ rights to regulate 
their own religious practices included the right to resent the performance of 
neutral acts that may have benefited the practice of another’s religion.”13 Waldron 
opposes the notion that the right to religious freedom includes the right to be free 
from offence. In Waldron’s view, Court decisions that imply this message sully 
the principle of freedom of religion, as members of a majority come to fear that 
their own rights will be narrowed in the name of minority concerns.14 
Waldron’s third main criticism of the jurisprudence is that, when courts 
are faced with an apparent conflict of rights, they err when they conceive of 
11. [1985] 1 SCR 295, 18 DLR (4th) 321.
12. Supra note 1 at 35. In Rosenberg v Outremont (City), Hilton J offered a similar observation 
about the effects of a Jewish eruv on non-Jews: “an eruv is only a religious zone for those 
who believe it to be one.” See [2001] RJQ 1556, 84 CRR (2d) 331 at para 44 (Que Sup Ct) 
[cited to RJQ].
13. Supra note 1 at 42.
14. Ibid at 76.
(2014) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL306
their judgments as balancing those rights.15 Rather, courts should understand 
the rights at issue as having an inherent relationship to one another wherein 
each defines the other’s limits. For Waldron, the key notion in this analysis is 
human dignity, the only concept “that can provide a relational aspect to human 
rights.”16 It is the reciprocal recognition of human dignity between persons that 
provides the foundation for human rights.17 Waldron recognizes that the SCC 
all but did away with human dignity as an independent analytic concept in its 
equality rights jurisprudence in R v Kapp.18 Her contention is that the pre-Kapp 
cases had taken too subjective an approach to human dignity, converting it into 
a “right to feel some particular emotion.”19 Waldron claims that human dignity 
can be better understood in an objective sense as “the real recognition of worth 
that comes from full participation in our society, in its goods, its services, its 
democratic processes, and its debates.”20
Waldron demonstrates how this analysis differs from the SCC’s in Trinity 
Western University v British Columbia College of Teachers.21 There, the Court 
was concerned with whether the College of Teachers had validly decided not to 
accredit a teacher-training program at Trinity Western University (TWU). Based 
on its understanding of Christianity, TWU required students to sign a document 
committing, among other things, to refrain from practices that are biblically 
15. The notion of balance, represented in iconic representations of justice, is difficult to escape 
even for Waldron: “we may be able to realize that protection of human dignity requires 
both freedom and equality – held perhaps in a difficult and creative balance, but of necessity 
operating together.” Ibid at 114 [emphasis added].”event-place”:”Toronto”,”author”:[{“fam
ily”:”Waldron”,”given”:”Mary Anne”}],”issued”:{“date-parts”:[[“2013”]]}},”locator”:”114”,
”prefix”:”The notion of balance, represented in iconic representations of justice, is difficult 
to escape even for Waldron: \”Yet if we focus on the concept of human dignity, which is the 
foundation of all human rights, we may be able to realize that protection of human dignity 
requires both freedom and equality – held perhaps in a difficult and creative balance, but 
of necessity operating together\”: “}],”schema”:”https://github.com/citation-style-language/
schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”} 
16. Ibid at 139.
17. Ibid at 154.
18. Ibid at 134, 143-44. See also R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 at paras 19-25, [2008] 2 SCR 483.
19. Waldron, supra note 1 at 154.
20. Ibid at 155.
21. Ibid at 167-71. See also Trinity Western University v British Columbia College of Teachers, 2001 
SCC 31, [2001] 1 SCR 772 [Trinity Western].
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condemned, including “homosexual behaviour.”22 The SCC determined that the 
College of Teachers had acted inappropriately by failing to give proper weight 
to the religious freedom rights of TWU members. Of central significance to the 
Court was the absence of evidence that a graduate of TWU’s teacher education 
program had acted in a discriminatory manner in the classroom.23 Based on a 
distinction between holding beliefs and acting on them, the SCC tipped the 
scales in favour of TWU, whose members had not acted in an objectionable way 
on the basis of their beliefs.
Waldron agrees with the result in the case. However, she takes issue with the 
Court’s analysis. For her, the distinction between the right to hold beliefs and the 
right to act on them, though frequently cited in later cases, is not of much help. 
The state cannot actually police what is in people’s heads; conflicts only arise 
when people act on their beliefs.24 Further, instead of focusing on whether there 
was evidence to support the assertion that TWU graduates would discriminate 
against their students,
the court could have focused on the rights of students in B.C. schools and the rights 
of students at Trinity Western University and considered them together as mutually 
dependent. Students in the public school system certainly have the right to receive 
from their teachers an education that treats them with dignity and respect and that 
does not differentiate between them on any prohibited ground. That does not mean 
that they have the right to be taught only by those who accept their belief systems 
and moral codes. The consequences of concluding otherwise would be to require 
schools to become impossibly ghettoized… .25
22. Ibid at para 4. A similar debate has surfaced recently as TWU has sought accreditation of a 
new law school. See Elaine Craig, “Law societies must show more courage on Trinity Western 
application” The Globe and Mail (18 December 2013), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.
com/globe-debate/law-societies-must-show-more-courage-on-trinity-western-application/
article16023053/>; Elaine Craig, “The Case for the Federation of Law Societies Rejecting 
Trinity Western University’s Proposed Law Degree Program” (2013) 25:1 CJWL 148; 
Dwight G Newman, “On the Trinity Western University Controversy: An Argument for a 
Christian Law School in Canada” (2013) 22:3 Constitutional Forum 1; Elaine Craig, “TWU 
Law: A Reply to Proponents of Approval” Dal LJ [forthcoming], online: <http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2446470>.
23. TWU had previously run a joint teacher-training program with another, non-Christian 
university where students would complete their last year of training. There was, therefore, a 
pool of graduates who had completed the majority of their training at TWU, none of whom 
had been shown to have acted discriminatorily in the classroom. See Trinity Western, supra 
note 20 at paras 32, 35.
24. Supra note 1 at 168.
25. Ibid at 169.
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In sum, Waldron advocates an understanding of conscience that focuses 
on its links to freedom and democracy, coupled with an approach that defines 
the relationship between rights through an objective concept of human 
dignity. In difficult cases where the relationship between rights does not admit 
of reconciliation, Waldron says that legislatures are better suited to choose 
which right should prevail. Courts should aim their analyses at preserving the 
opportunities for democratic debate or, where a legislature has not yet spoken 
on which right should prevail, “strive to create neutral spaces where all views can 
be heard.”26 
There is much to commend in Waldron’s approach to the right of conscientious 
freedom. Canadian courts have given little guidance with respect to “conscience” 
in freedom of conscience and religion. However, it is somewhat puzzling that 
Waldron does not spend much time engaging with the rare occasions on which 
conscientious freedom has been addressed by Canadian judges. Waldron rightly 
notes that in R v Morgentaler27 the majority of the Court failed to consider a 
conscience-based argument. However, she does not mention that Justice Wilson’s 
concurring opinion grounded a woman’s right to choose whether to have an 
abortion in the right of conscientious freedom, and that Justice Wilson specifically 
linked that right to the maintenance of a free and democratic society.28 Similarly, 
though Waldron discusses an impressive array of tribunal and court decisions, 
she does not discuss some of the only cases in which the right to conscientious 
freedom has been specifically raised and addressed by Canadian adjudicators. 
These include an unsuccessful claim for an exemption from taking an oath of 
loyalty to the Queen in a citizenship ceremony29 and a prisoner’s successful claim, 
on non-religious grounds, for a vegetarian diet.30 It is not clear from the book 
what Waldron makes of these decisions.
A more difficult question is whether Waldron’s characterization of 
conscientious freedom makes it indistinguishable from the SCC’s current 
approach to expressive freedom. As noted above, Waldron argues that the real 
26. Ibid at 233, 224.
27. Ibid at 201-202. See also R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30, 63 OR (2d) 281 (SCC).
28. Supra note 1 at 176–80. See also Richard A Haigh, A Burl on the Living Tree: Freedom 
of Conscience in Section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (SJD Thesis, 
University of Toronto Faculty of Law, 2012) [unpublished].
29. Roach v Canada (Minister of State for Multiculturalism and Citizenship) (CA), [1994] 2 FC 
406, 113 DLR (4th) 67. See also Roach v Ontario (Attorney General), 2012 ONSC 3521, 
[2012] OJ No 2842 (QL); McAteer et al v Attorney General of Canada, 2013 ONSC 5895, 
117 OR (3d) 353.
30. Maurice v Canada (Attorney General), 2002 FCT 69, 210 DLR (4th) 186.
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import of religious and conscientious freedom is the degree to which it protects 
individuals’ and communities’ rights to act on their beliefs. She further argues 
that the purpose of conscientious freedom is related to the maintenance of a 
free and democratic society where ideas are continually debated and revisited. 
These two aspects of Waldron’s argument parallel the SCC’s approach to freedom 
of expression. Freedom of expression protects expressive activities that attempt 
“to convey meaning”31 for the purposes of “individual self-fulfilment, finding 
the truth through the open exchange of ideas, and the political discourse 
fundamental to democracy.”32 If Waldron believes that the SCC’s jurisprudence 
on conscientious freedom lacks a connection to conscience’s public dimension, 
should not freedom of expression, as the SCC currently understands it, provide 
sufficient protection for such activities? Justice LeBel may have had similar 
questions in mind when, in a dissenting opinion, he wrote:
One might have thought that the guarantee of freedom of opinion, freedom of con-
science, freedom of expression and freedom of association could very well have been 
sufficient to protect freedom of religion. But the framers of the Charter thought fit 
to incorporate into the Charter an express guarantee of freedom of religion, which 
must be given meaning and effect.33
Indeed, for some of the problems that Waldron addresses, freedom of 
expression would appear to provide a good solution. For instance, Waldron argues 
that “ignoring the conscience aspects of [a proposed ban on burkas] enables the 
supporters of the ban to ignore the negative and anti-democratic effects of the 
action.”34 It is not clear, however, why freedom of expression would not be equally 
suited here, at least in connection with the maintenance of a public forum open 
to debate and discussion. Accordingly, it is not clear that the absence of a strong 
jurisprudence of conscientious freedom is to blame for calls to ban the burka.
Other examples that Waldron uses might more helpfully clarify where 
conscientious freedom might fill a gap in the discussion. One issue that is mentioned 
repeatedly in her book is the constitutional validity of the criminalization of 
assisted suicide, upheld by the SCC35 and again, more recently, by the British 
31. Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 927 at 968, 58 DLR (4th) 577.
32. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11 at para 65, [2013] 1 
SCR 467.
33. Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 at para 180, [2009] 2 SCR 567.
34. Supra note 1 at 204.
35. Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 SCR 519, 85 CCC (3d) 15.
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Columbia Court of Appeal.36 The procedures carried out by a physician who assists 
in suicide may not be seen, in themselves, as having expressive content if they are 
not carried out as part of a protest against the criminal provisions. Participation in 
the procedure, however, may nevertheless be regarded as an act of conscience even 
if the physician is not religiously motivated. In this sense, conscientious freedom 
covers ground that expressive and religious freedoms do not. 
But does this ground relate to conscience’s public dimension, which Waldron 
argues is the primary reason for the constitutional protection of conscientious 
freedom? Not in terms of the physician’s right to publicly engage in protest or 
declare an opinion, which would be protected by freedom of expression (though 
perhaps legitimately limited if the protest involved the death of a patient). From 
the patient’s perspective, the right does not truly seem to be about access to a 
public good, but about the right to have autonomy over one’s fate, which might 
also be properly considered a private dimension of conscience. It might be that 
what distinguishes freedom of conscience from freedom of expression are exactly 
those private acts not intended to convey a meaning to anyone. 
In sum, Waldron’s book provides valuable reading for those interested 
in puzzling through the relationships between equality, religious freedom, 
conscientious freedom, and democracy. Waldron has offered a potent description 
of why constitutions protect conscientious freedom and has contrasted this 
compellingly with the purposes of equality rights. Perhaps Waldron’s most 
far-reaching contribution is her relational analysis of human rights, in which 
each right depends upon and must be interpreted in light of the others. Future 
scholarship might further develop what distinguishes freedom of conscience 
from other fundamental freedoms like freedom of expression. 
36. Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 BCCA 435, 293 CRR (2d) 109 [Carter], rev’ing 
2012 BCSC 886, 261 CRR (2d) 1. Leave to appeal Carter to the SCC was granted. See 
35591 (16 January 2014). The appeal to the SCC was argued 15 October 2014.
